Learning dynamics, genetic algorithms, and corporate takeovers

DOI10.1016/S0165-1889(99)00004-4zbMATH Open1037.91543OpenAlexW2902223901MaRDI QIDQ1606192FDOQ1606192

Authors: Thomas H. Noe, Lynn Li 

Publication date: 30 July 2002

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1889(99)00004-4

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zbMATH Keywords

coordination failureNash equilibriumfree-ridingshareholdersgenetic-learning algorithm

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Genetic algorithm learning and the cobweb model
• TAKEOVERS OF DIFFUSELY HELD FIRMS: A NONSTANDARD APPROACH

Cited In (1)

• Learning to bid: the design of auctions under uncertainty and adaptation

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