Learning dynamics, genetic algorithms, and corporate takeovers

DOI10.1016/S0165-1889(99)00004-4MaRDI QIDQ1606192zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Thomas H. Noe, Lynn Li

Publication date 30 July 2002

Published in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1889(99)00004-4

zbMATH Keywords

coordination failureNash equilibriumfree-ridingshareholdersgenetic-learning algorithm

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Recommendations

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 764436
• Learning in economics. Analysis and applications of genetic algorithms
• Adaptive learning by genetic algorithms. Analytic results and applications to economic models
• Genetic algorithm learning and evolutionary games
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1416203
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1425467
• LEARNING, EVOLUTION AND POPULATION DYNAMICS
• The dynamics of a genetic algorithm for a simple learning problem
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1189218

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3497315 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1424768 (Why is no real title available?)
• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• Genetic algorithm learning and the cobweb model
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• TAKEOVERS OF DIFFUSELY HELD FIRMS: A NONSTANDARD APPROACH

Cited in

(1)

• Learning to bid: the design of auctions under uncertainty and adaptation

This page was built for publication: Learning dynamics, genetic algorithms, and corporate takeovers

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1606192)