Weak independence and veto power.

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(99)00209-8MaRDI QIDQ1606284zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Donald E. Campbell, Jerry S. Kelly

Publication date 24 July 2002

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(99)00209-8

zbMATH Keywords

veto powerweak independence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

• Weak independent decisiveness and the existence of a unique vetoer
• Veto in fixed agenda social choice correspondences
• Veto theorems with expansion consistency conditions and without the weak Pareto principle
• Weak independence and the Pareto principle
• Social choice without the Pareto principle under weak independence

Cites work

• A dictionary for voting paradoxes
• Democratic preference functions
• Geometry of voting
• Independence of irrelevant alternatives in the theory of voting
• Nonbinary social choice for economic environments
• Twitching weak dictators

Cited in

(11)

• Voting theory in the Lean theorem prover
• Approval voting and Arrow's impossibility theorem
• Veto in fixed agenda social choice correspondences
• Quasi-decisiveness, quasi-ultrafilter, and social quasi-orderings
• Social choice correspondences with infinitely many agents: serial dictatorship
• Weak independence and the Pareto principle
• Independence of irrelevant alternatives revisited
• Social choice without the Pareto principle under weak independence
• Weak independent decisiveness and the existence of a unique vetoer
• Escaping Arrow's theorem: the advantage-standard model
• Impossibility theorems are modified and unified

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