Technological improvements in vaccine efficacy and individual incentive to vaccinate

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(99)00178-0MaRDI QIDQ1606385zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Xiaopeng Xu

Publication date 1 September 2002

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(99)00178-0

zbMATH Keywords

vaccinetechnological improvements

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mathematical psychology (91E99)

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Cites work

• Preface

Cited in

(1)

• The economics of vaccination

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