Technological improvements in vaccine efficacy and individual incentive to vaccinate
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Publication:1606385
DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(99)00178-0zbMATH Open1027.91072OpenAlexW2052638288MaRDI QIDQ1606385FDOQ1606385
Authors: Xiaopeng Xu
Publication date: 1 September 2002
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(99)00178-0
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