Political determinants of central bank independence

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(02)00120-9MaRDI QIDQ1614830zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Etienne Farvaque

Publication date 9 September 2002

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-1765(02)00120-9

zbMATH Keywords

central bankindependencepolitical economypolitical systemssenate

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10)

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Cites work

• Fiscal decentralization, central bank independence, and inflation

Cited in

(5)

• The effect of central bank independence on inflation in developing countries
• Populism, political pressure and central bank (in)dependence
• On Central Bank Independence and the Stability of Policy Targets
• A CENTRAL BANK FOR ALL SEASONS? THE LOWER INFLATION AT NO COST PROPOSITION UNDER CONDITIONS OF POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY
• Central bank independence, financial openness, and cross-border flows of capital

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