Voting with your feet: payoff biased migration and the evolution of group beneficial behavior

DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2008.12.007zbMath1400.91442OpenAlexW2048399672WikidataQ46024761 ScholiaQ46024761MaRDI QIDQ1617561

Peter J. Richerson, Robert W. Boyd

Publication date: 8 November 2018

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2008.12.007

zbMATH Keywords

equilibrium selectionpopulation structurecultural evolution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10) Mathematical geography and demography (91D20) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (8)

Evolution of cooperation among game players with non-uniform migration scopes ⋮ Polarization and segregation through conformity pressure and voluntary migration: simulation analysis of co-evolutionary dynamics ⋮ Robustness of linkage strategy that leads to large-scale cooperation ⋮ Climate change induced migration and the evolution of cooperation ⋮ Linkage based on the \textit{kandori} norm successfully sustains cooperation in social dilemmas ⋮ Global migration can lead to stronger spatial selection than local migration ⋮ The coevolution of culture and environment ⋮ Retaliation and the role for punishment in the evolution of cooperation

Cites Work

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