Carbon emission reduction and pricing policies of a supply chain considering reciprocal preferences in cap-and-trade system
DOI10.1007/s10479-017-2657-2zbMath1405.90022OpenAlexW2762414683MaRDI QIDQ1622044
Xiaohang Yue, Juanjuan Qin, Ning Zhu, Liangjie Xia, Ting-Ting Guo
Publication date: 12 November 2018
Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-017-2657-2
dynamic gamecap-and-tradecarbon emission reductionconsumers' low-carbon awarenessreciprocal preferencessystem efficiency
Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Inventory, storage, reservoirs (90B05) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Dynamic games (91A25)
Related Items (19)
Cites Work
- Reciprocal supply chain with intention
- Consumer environmental awareness and competition in two-stage supply chains
- Environmental policy and international trade when governments and producers act strategically
- The carbon-constrained EOQ
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- How supply chain coordination affects the environment: a carbon footprint perspective
- Environmental considerations on the optimal product mix
- Information Goods vs. Industrial Goods: Cost Structure and Competition
- Social Preferences and Supply Chain Performance: An Experimental Study
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