An efficient ascending auction for private valuations
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Publication:1622372
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2018.07.005zbMATH Open1417.91226OpenAlexW2883804650WikidataQ129488366 ScholiaQ129488366MaRDI QIDQ1622372FDOQ1622372
Authors: Oleg Baranov 
Publication date: 19 November 2018
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.07.005
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Cited In (18)
- Informational limitations of ascending combinatorial auctions
- Inefficient rushes in auctions
- On minimal ascending auctions with payment discounts
- Walrasian equilibria from an optimization perspective: A guide to the literature
- An Efficient Multi-Unit Ascending Auction
- Ex ante incentive efficient trading mechanisms without the private valuation restriction
- Asymptotic Efficiency for Discriminatory Private Value Auctions
- Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations
- On ascending Vickrey auctions for heterogeneous objects
- Efficiency of Large Private Value Auctions
- An ascending Vickrey auction for selling bases of a matroid
- Ascending price Vickrey auctions
- Iterative auction design for tree valuations
- Inefficiency of equilibria in digital mechanisms with continuous valuations
- Abstract types and distributions in independent private value auctions
- The private value single item bisection auction
- Position auctions with multi-unit demands
- An ascending implementation of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism for the licensed shared access
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