On the genericity of the finite number of equilibria in multicriteria games: a counterexample

DOI10.1504/IJMOR.2013.057494MaRDI QIDQ1635385zbMATH OpenWikidataFDO

Authors Giuseppe De Marco

Publication date 6 June 2018

Published in International Journal of Mathematics in Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1504/IJMOR.2013.057494

zbMATH Keywords

finite multicriteria gamegenericityPareto-Nash equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Review text

Summary: The famous Harsanyi's Theorem [\textit{J. C. Harsanyi}, Int. J. Game Theory 2, 235--250 (1973; Zbl 0274.90085)] states that a generic finite game has an odd number of Nash equilibria in mixed strategies. In this paper, counterexamples are given showing that for finite multicriteria games (games with vector-valued payoffs) this kind of result does not hold. In particular, it is shown that it is possible to find balls in the space of games such that every game in this set has uncountably many equilibria. This result then formalises the intuitive idea that games with uncountable sets of equilibria are not non-generic in the multicriteria case.

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