The combination of two tragedies: commons and anticommons tragedies

DOI10.1007/S00712-017-0534-8zbMATH Open1402.91313OpenAlexW2602923818MaRDI QIDQ1650979

Chorng-Jian Liu, Chia-Hung Sun

Publication date: 16 July 2018

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-017-0534-8

zbMATH Keywords

duopolyCournotanticommonscomplementary monopolycommons

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
• Complementing Cournot's analysis of complements: unidirectional complementarity and mergers
• Separating complements: the effects of competition and quality leadership
• Free entry and social inefficiency under co-opetition
• Competition and Regulation in Vertically Related Markets
• Downstream and upstream oligopolies when retailer's effort matters

Cited In (1)

• Optimal taxation in a common resource oligopoly game

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