HILA5 pindakaas: on the CCA security of lattice-based encryption with error correction
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Publication:1653237
DOI10.1007/978-3-319-89339-6_12zbMATH Open1423.94051OpenAlexW2794472443MaRDI QIDQ1653237FDOQ1653237
Authors: Daniel J. Bernstein, Leon Groot Bruinderink, Tanja Lange, Lorenz Panny
Publication date: 17 July 2018
Full work available at URL: https://research.tue.nl/nl/publications/e79aedbc-f736-4dc3-ac22-29f0ef13561d
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Cited In (8)
- Key mismatch attack on ThreeBears, Frodo and Round5
- HILA5: on reliability, reconciliation, and error correction for Ring LWE encryption
- A Systematic Approach and Analysis of Key Mismatch Attacks on Lattice-Based NIST Candidate KEMs
- A novel classical and quantum cryptographic scheme for data encryption
- A key-recovery timing attack on post-quantum primitives using the Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation and its application on FrodoKEM
- A one-time single-bit fault leaks all previous NTRU-HRSS session keys to a chosen-ciphertext attack
- Classical misuse attacks on NIST round 2 PQC. The power of rank-based schemes
- Do Not Bound to a Single Position: Near-Optimal Multi-positional Mismatch Attacks Against Kyber and Saber
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