Endogenous leverage and asset pricing in double auctions
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Publication:1657588
DOI10.1016/J.JEDC.2015.02.004zbMath1401.91084OpenAlexW2020042768MaRDI QIDQ1657588
Thomas Breuer, Martin Jandačka, Martin Summer, Hans-Joachim Vollbrecht
Publication date: 13 August 2018
Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://www.oenb.at/dam/jcr:2fb1fdaf-2555-4503-a5d6-ac5c267710d3/wp184_screen_tcm16-256982.pdf
Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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Cites Work
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