Pricing analysis in Geo/Geo/1 queueing system
Summary: This paper studies the equilibrium behavior of customers and optimal pricing strategies of servers in a \(Geo/Geo/1\) queueing system. Two common pricing mechanisms are considered. The first one is called ex-post payment (EPP) scheme where the server collects tolls proportional to queue times, and the second one is called ex-ante payment (EAP) scheme where the server charges a flat fee for the total service. The server sets the toll price to maximize its own profit. It is found that, under a customer's choice equilibrium, the two toll mechanisms are equivalent from the economic point of view. Finally, we present several numerical experiments to investigate the effects of system parameters on the equilibrium customer joining rate and servers' profits.
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- Discrete-time queuing theory
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- Equilibrium balking behavior in the Geo/Geo/1 queueing system with multiple vacations
- Equilibrium customer strategies in the \(Geo/Geo/1\) queue with single working vacation
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3858110 (Why is no real title available?)
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