Many-to-one matchings without substitutability
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Recommendations
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Cites work
- A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- College applications and the effect of affirmative action
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
- Stability and preference alignment in matching and coalition formation
- Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues
- Unravelling in two-sided matching markets and similarity of preferences
Cited in
(7)- The law of aggregate demand and welfare in the two-sided matching market
- A modified deferred acceptance algorithm for conditionally lexicographic-substitutable preferences
- Matching with preferences over colleagues solves classical matching
- Hedonic games related to many-to-one matching problems
- Unilateral substitutability implies substitutable completability in many-to-one matching with contracts
- College admissions with budget complementarities
- The college admissions problem with lower and common quotas
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