Implementability, Walrasian equilibria, and efficient matchings

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2017.01.022MaRDI QIDQ1672900zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Piotr Dworczak, Anthony Lee Zhang

Publication date 11 September 2018

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.01.022

zbMATH Keywords

assignment problemefficient matchingsimplementabilitymechanism designWalrasian equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Recommendations

• Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence: the boundary problem
• Walrasian and constrained Walrasian correspondences and Nash implementation
• Nash implementation of matching rules
• Nash implementation of constrained efficient stable matchings under weak priorities
• Implementation in generalized matching problems

Cites work

• A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasilinear context
• Bayesian incentive compatibility via matchings
• Characterization of Revenue Equivalence
• Extremal incentive compatible transfers
• Mechanism design without revenue equivalence
• The assignment game. I: The core

Cited in

(3)

• Nash implementation of constrained efficient stable matchings under weak priorities
• The impossibility of strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and individually rational rules for fractional matching
• Course Match: A Large-Scale Implementation of Approximate Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes for Combinatorial Allocation

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