An equilibrium model for the cement sector: EU-ETS analysis with power contracts
DOI10.1007/S10479-016-2200-XzbMATH Open1415.91196OpenAlexW2343942567MaRDI QIDQ1699073FDOQ1699073
Authors: E. Allevi, Giorgia Oggioni, Rossana Riccardi, Marco Rocco 
Publication date: 16 February 2018
Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-016-2200-x
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generalized Nash gamecement sector competitivenesscomplementarity modelingEU-ETSlong-term power contracts
Noncooperative games (91A10) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54) Discrete location and assignment (90B80)
Cites Work
- Interfaces to PATH 3.0: Design, implementation and usage
- Complementarity problems in GAMS and the PATH solver
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- On some non-linear elliptic differential functional equations
- Finite-Dimensional Variational Inequalities and Complementarity Problems
- On generalized Nash games and variational inequalities
- Generalized Nash equilibrium problems
- Network economics. A variational inequality approach.
Cited In (3)
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