Robust comparative statics for non-monotone shocks in large aggregative games
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Publication:1701036
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2017.12.003zbMath1400.91037OpenAlexW3025916772MaRDI QIDQ1701036
Carmen Camacho, Çağrı Ç. Sağlam, Takashi Kamihigashi
Publication date: 22 February 2018
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2017.12.003
stochastic dominancemean-preserving spreadslarge aggregative gamespositive shocksrobust comparative statics
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