Interaction of fiscal and monetary policy in a monetary union under the zero lower bound constraint
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Publication:1703548
DOI10.1007/S10479-017-2530-3zbMATH Open1404.91213OpenAlexW2615811263MaRDI QIDQ1703548FDOQ1703548
Authors: Stefanie Flotho 
Publication date: 2 March 2018
Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-017-2530-3
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Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium theory (91B51)
Cites Work
Cited In (7)
- Monetary and fiscal policy interaction in the EMU: A dynamic game approach
- On the logic of fiscal policy coordination in a monetary union
- The fiscal multiplier and spillover in a global liquidity trap
- Optimal fiscal and monetary policy with occasionally binding zero bound constraints
- Strategic interactions among central bank and national fiscal authorities in a monetary union subject to asymmetric country shocks
- Operational aspect of the policy coordination for financial stability: role of Jeffreys-Lindley's paradox in operations research
- Unconventional monetary and fiscal policies in interconnected economies: do policy rules matter?
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