Interaction of fiscal and monetary policy in a monetary union under the zero lower bound constraint

DOI10.1007/S10479-017-2530-3MaRDI QIDQ1703548zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Stefanie Flotho

Publication date 2 March 2018

Published in Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-017-2530-3

zbMATH Keywords

fiscal policymonetary unionzero lower boundnon-coordinationOccBin-toolkit

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium theory (91B51)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• International Risk Sharing and the Transmission of Productivity Shocks
• The Solution of Linear Difference Models under Rational Expectations

Cited in

(7)

• Monetary and fiscal policy interaction in the EMU: A dynamic game approach
• On the logic of fiscal policy coordination in a monetary union
• The fiscal multiplier and spillover in a global liquidity trap
• Optimal fiscal and monetary policy with occasionally binding zero bound constraints
• Strategic interactions among central bank and national fiscal authorities in a monetary union subject to asymmetric country shocks
• Operational aspect of the policy coordination for financial stability: role of Jeffreys-Lindley's paradox in operations research
• Unconventional monetary and fiscal policies in interconnected economies: do policy rules matter?

Describes a project that uses

Uses Software

• OccBin
• Dynare

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