The probabilistic no miracles argument
DOI10.1007/S13194-015-0122-0zbMATH Open1382.03034OpenAlexW2125226087WikidataQ30376885 ScholiaQ30376885MaRDI QIDQ1705321FDOQ1705321
Authors: Peng Zhang
Publication date: 15 March 2018
Published in: European Journal for Philosophy of Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-015-0122-0
Recommendations
scientific realismBayesian epistemologybase rate fallacyno miracles argumentstability of scientific theories
Foundations and philosophical topics in statistics (62A01) Logic in the philosophy of science (03A10)
Cites Work
- Statistical Evidence
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- How to Tell When Simpler, More Unified, or LessAd HocTheories will Provide More Accurate Predictions
- Confirmation as partial entailment: a representation theorem in inductive logic
- The no alternatives argument
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- The semantic or model-theoretic view of theories and scientific realism
Cited In (7)
- The no miracles argument without the base rate fallacy
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- A note on ``The no alternatives argument by Richard Dawid, Stephan Hartmann and Jan Sprenger
- Realism and empirical equivalence
- Levin and Ghins on the ``no miracle argument and naturalism
- The no miracles argument and the base rate fallacy
- Fifteen arguments against hypothetical frequentism
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