Strategy-proofness of scoring allocation correspondences for indivisible goods
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Publication:1707112
DOI10.1007/s00355-017-1075-3zbMath1392.91110OpenAlexW3016144718MaRDI QIDQ1707112
Nhan-Tam Nguyen, Dorothea Baumeister, Jörg Rothe
Publication date: 28 March 2018
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-017-1075-3
Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Social choice (91B14)
Related Items (4)
Strategy-proofness of scoring allocation correspondences for indivisible goods ⋮ Duplication monotonicity in the allocation of indivisible goods ⋮ Control complexity in Borda elections: solving all open cases of offline control and some cases of online control ⋮ Borda-induced hedonic games with friends, enemies, and neutral players
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