Negative doxastic voluntarism and the concept of belief

DOI10.1007/S11229-016-1032-1zbMATH Open1417.03097OpenAlexW2256340439MaRDI QIDQ1708860

Hans Rott

Publication date: 27 March 2018

Published in: Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1032-1

zbMATH Keywords

belief changebeliefbelief statedoxastic voluntarismsuspension of disbelief

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42)

Cites Work

• Two modellings for theory change
• Change, choice and inference. A study of belief revision and nonmonotonic reasoning
• Beliefs, Degrees of Belief, and the Lockean Thesis
• Degrees All the Way Down: Beliefs, Non-Beliefs and Disbeliefs
• Semi-revision
• Shifting Priorities: Simple Representations for Twenty-Seven Iterated Theory Change Operators
• Reversing the Levi identity
• Contraction, Revision, Expansion: Representing Belief Change Operations
• Title not available (Why is that?)
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Cited In (1)

• On Abel's concept of doubt and pessimism

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