Strategic delegation effects on Cournot and Stackelberg competition

DOI10.3934/JDG.2018015zbMath1406.91229OpenAlexW3023471546WikidataQ129467125 ScholiaQ129467125MaRDI QIDQ1714495

Nickolas J. Michelacakis

Publication date: 1 February 2019

Published in: Journal of Dynamics and Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2018015

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryCournot competitionStackelberg competitionstrategic delegation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Related Items (1)

Product green degree, service free-riding, strategic price difference in a dual-channel supply chain based on dynamic game

Cites Work

• Commitment, first-mover-, and second-mover advantage
• Cournot and Stackelberg equilibrium under strategic delegation: an equivalence result
• First Mover and Second Mover Advantages

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