Procedural interpretation and associated consistency for the Egalitarian Shapley values
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Publication:1728177
DOI10.1016/J.ORL.2017.01.012zbMath1409.91024OpenAlexW2588702953MaRDI QIDQ1728177
Hao Sun, Dongshuang Hou, Wenna Wang, Gen-Jiu Xu
Publication date: 22 February 2019
Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2017.01.012
cooperative gameJordan normal formassociated consistencyegalitarian Shapley value$\alpha$-dummy player property
Related Items (3)
The family of ideal values for cooperative games ⋮ Necessary players, myerson fairness and the equal treatment of equals ⋮ Procedural implementation and axiomatization of the weighted nonseparable cost value
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