The instability of matching with overconfident agents
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Cites work
- Boston versus deferred acceptance in an interim setting: an experimental investigation
- Boys will be boys: Gender, overconfidence, and common stock investment
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Ex-ante fairness in the Boston and serial dictatorship mechanisms under pre-exam and post-exam preference submission
- Matching mechanisms and matching quality: evidence from a top university in China
- On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
- School choice and information: An experimental study on matching mechanisms
- School choice: an experimental study
Cited in
(8)- Two-sided matching and strategic selection on freight resource sharing platforms
- Matching inequality and strategic behavior under the Boston mechanism: evidence from China's college admissions
- High school admission reform in China: a welfare analysis
- Costly information acquisition in centralized matching markets
- Preference submission timing and college admission outcomes: evidence from Turkey
- Regret-free truth-telling in school choice with consent
- Incomplete information, self-confidence, and positive sorting
- Nonstandard choice in matching markets
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