Knowing me, imagining you: projection and overbidding in auctions
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Publication:1735761
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2018.10.004zbMath1419.91314OpenAlexW2896987859WikidataQ129054496 ScholiaQ129054496MaRDI QIDQ1735761
Publication date: 29 March 2019
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/62052/1/MPRA_paper_62052.pdf
Applications of statistics to economics (62P20) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90)
Uses Software
Cites Work
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