Hidden action and outcome contractibility: an experimental test of moral hazard theory
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Cites work
- An Application of Hierarchical Kappa-type Statistics in the Assessment of Majority Agreement among Multiple Observers
- Bare promises: an experiment
- Communication and efficiency in competitive coordination games
- Competition in Lending: Theory and Experiments*
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- Do sellers offer menus of contracts to separate buyer types? An experimental test of adverse selection theory
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4207455 (Why is no real title available?)
- On the interplay of hidden action and hidden information in simple bilateral trading problems
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
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- Promises and Partnership
- Relational Contracts and the Nature of Market Interactions
- Subgame-perfect implementation under information perturbations
- What motivates effort? Evidence and expert forecasts
Cited in
(8)- Moral hazard, risk seeking, and free riding
- Salience bias and overwork
- Securities auctions under moral hazard: an experimental study
- Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: a laboratory experiment
- Moral hazard: experimental evidence from tenancy contracts
- Disclosing products' freshness level as a non-contractible quality: optimal logistics service contracts in the fresh products supply chain
- Reciprocity and gift exchange in markets for credence goods
- Information disclosure in mitigating moral hazard: an experimental investigation
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