Whether or not to open Pandora's box
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Publication:1753685
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2018.01.005zbMATH Open1420.90029OpenAlexW2108737331MaRDI QIDQ1753685FDOQ1753685
Publication date: 29 May 2018
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20180131-102705515
Cites Work
- Signal Orderings Based on Dispersion and the Supply of Private Information in Auctions
- Optimal Procurement Contracts with Pre-Project Planning
- Optimal Search for the Best Alternative
- Simultaneous Search
- Attributes
- A more general Pandora rule?
- Parallel search for the best alternative
- Stoppable families of alternative bandit processes
- Optimal learning before choice
- Delegated information acquisition with moral hazard
Cited In (16)
- Consumer search with blind buying
- Optimal learning before choice
- Prices as signals of product quality in a duopoly
- Player-compatible learning and player-compatible equilibrium
- Legislative informational lobbying
- Optimal multi-unit allocation with costly verification
- Strategic experimentation with random serial dictatorship
- Auction design with shortlisting when value discovery is covert
- Optimal Dynamic Information Acquisition
- School choice with costly information acquisition
- A stochastic differential equation driven by Poisson random measure and its application in a duopoly market
- Pandora Box problem with nonobligatory inspection: hardness and approximation scheme
- Pandora's problem with nonobligatory inspection: optimal structure and a PTAS
- Delegated Concept Testing in New Product Development
- Procurement Mechanisms with Post-Auction Pre-Award Cost-Reduction Investigations
- Mechanism design with costly verification and limited punishments
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