Whether or not to open Pandora's box
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Publication:1753685
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2018.01.005zbMath1420.90029OpenAlexW2108737331MaRDI QIDQ1753685
Publication date: 29 May 2018
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20180131-102705515
Related Items (13)
Delegated Concept Testing in New Product Development ⋮ Procurement Mechanisms with Post-Auction Pre-Award Cost-Reduction Investigations ⋮ Strategic experimentation with random serial dictatorship ⋮ Optimal multi-unit allocation with costly verification ⋮ Legislative informational lobbying ⋮ Auction design with shortlisting when value discovery is covert ⋮ Optimal Dynamic Information Acquisition ⋮ Prices as signals of product quality in a duopoly ⋮ School choice with costly information acquisition ⋮ Optimal learning before choice ⋮ Consumer search with blind buying ⋮ Player-compatible learning and player-compatible equilibrium ⋮ Mechanism design with costly verification and limited punishments
Cites Work
- A more general Pandora rule?
- Parallel search for the best alternative
- Optimal learning before choice
- Attributes
- Simultaneous Search
- Signal Orderings Based on Dispersion and the Supply of Private Information in Auctions
- Optimal Search for the Best Alternative
- Stoppable families of alternative bandit processes
- Optimal Procurement Contracts with Pre-Project Planning
- Delegated information acquisition with moral hazard
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