Two-sided allocation problems, decomposability, and the impossibility of efficient trade

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2018.11.004zbMath1419.91395OpenAlexW2900626958WikidataQ128885367 ScholiaQ128885367MaRDI QIDQ1757552

Tom Wilkening, Simon Loertscher, David Delacrétaz, Leslie M. Marx

Publication date: 15 January 2019

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11343/219217

zbMATH Keywords

decomposabilitymechanism designimpossibility theoremsassignment gamessize-dependent discounts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Trade models (91B60) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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Asymptotically optimal prior-free clock auctions, A dominant-strategy asset market mechanism, When Walras meets Vickrey, Comparative statics for size-dependent discounts in matching markets, Quantile stable mechanisms, The deficit on each trade in a Vickrey double auction is at least as large as the Walrasian price gap

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