College admissions with entrance exams: centralized versus decentralized
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1757600
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2018.05.009zbMath1419.91526OpenAlexW2133013756WikidataQ125879831 ScholiaQ125879831MaRDI QIDQ1757600
Dorothea Kübler, Morimitsu Kurino, Isa E. Hafalir, Rustamdjan Hakimov
Publication date: 15 January 2019
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10453/130078
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90) Matching models (91B68)
Related Items (10)
Decentralized college admissions under single application ⋮ Parallel Innovation Contests ⋮ The exam location problem: mathematical formulations and variants ⋮ Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification ⋮ Financial aid in college admissions: need-based versus merit-based ⋮ Matching inequality and strategic behavior under the Boston mechanism: evidence from China's college admissions ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ College assignment as a large contest ⋮ Ex-ante fairness in the Boston and serial dictatorship mechanisms under pre-exam and post-exam preference submission ⋮ A college admissions clearinghouse
Uses Software
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Stability and strategy-proofness for college admissions with an eligibility criterion
- Incentive compatibility for the stable matching model with an entrance criterion
- All-pay auctions with risk-averse players
- Competing auctions with endogenous quantities
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
- College assignment as a large contest
- The all-pay auction with complete information
- Chinese college admissions and school choice reforms: an experimental study
- A stable matching model with an entrance criterion applied to the assignment of students to dormitories at the Technion
- Contest architecture
- School choice: an experimental study
- Behavior in all-pay auctions with incomplete information
- Continuum and Finite-Player Noncooperative Models of Competition
- All-Pay Contests
- Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers
- The Dynamics of Reorganization in Matching Markets: A Laboratory Experiment Motivated by A Natural Experiments*
- Student Portfolios and the College Admissions Problem
- Competing Mechanisms in a Common Value Environment
- Competing auctions: Finite markets and convergence
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
This page was built for publication: College admissions with entrance exams: centralized versus decentralized
