Multidimensional screening.

DOI10.1007/b138910zbMath1104.91023MaRDI QIDQ1763128

Suren Basov

Publication date: 21 February 2005

Published in: Studies in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/b138910

zbMATH Keywords

dual approach; implementability; monopolist; continuum of consumers; multidimensional screening problem; Hamilton approach; random participation constraint; the Spence-Mirrlees conditions; type dependent participation constraint; unidimensional screening model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B24: Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets)

91B32: Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.)

91-01: Introductory exposition (textbooks, tutorial papers, etc.) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance

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