Government guarantees and self-fulfilling speculative attacks
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Recommendations
- Government guarantees and financial stability
- Self-fulfilling currency crises with borrowing constraints and domestic currency debt
- Self-fulfilling crises with default and devaluation
- A corporate balance-sheet approach to currency crises
- Why clashes between internal and external stability goals end in currency crises
Cites work
Cited in
(12)- Government guarantees and financial stability
- Identifying networks in social media: the case of \textit{\#Grexit}
- Divided governments and futures prices
- Defending against speculative attacks: the policy Maker's reputation
- Unconventional bank bailouts in fixed exchange rate regimes
- Twin banking and currency crises and monetary policy
- The CAPM, national stock market betas, and macroeconomic covariates: a global analysis
- LEARNING DYNAMICS AND ENDOGENOUS CURRENCY CRISES
- A leverage-based model of speculative bubbles
- Self-fulfilling currency crises with borrowing constraints and domestic currency debt
- Banking and sovereign debt crises in a monetary union without central bank intervention
- The credibility of a threat to nationalize
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