Social choice and information: the informational structure of uniqueness theorems in axiomatic social theories

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2003.11.004zbMath1088.91022MaRDI QIDQ1763882

Marek Mikolaj Kaminski

Publication date: 22 February 2005

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2003.11.004

zbMATH Keywords

Bargaining; Voting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B14: Social choice

Cites Work

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