A power analysis of linear games with consensus
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Publication:1763889
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2004.03.004zbMath1087.91005MaRDI QIDQ1763889
Francesc Carreras, Josep Freixas
Publication date: 22 February 2005
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2004.03.004
Shapley-Shubik power index; Simple game; Linear game; Voting by count and account; Weighted majority game
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A minimum dimensional class of simple games, The dimension for the European Union Council under the Nice rules.
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