Replicator dynamics and evolutionary game of social tolerance: the role of neutral agents

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2017.07.005MaRDI QIDQ1782376zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yingying Shi, Min Pan, Daiyan Peng

Publication date 20 September 2018

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.07.005

zbMATH Keywords

tolerancereplicator dynamicseconomic interaction model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Evolutionary games (91A22)

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Cites work

• Economic interactions and social tolerance: a dynamic perspective

Cited in

(6)

• Interaction patterns and coordination in two population groups: a dynamic perspective
• COVID-19 and stigma: evolution of self-restraint behavior
• New optical soliton solutions to the fractional hyperbolic nonlinear Schrödinger equation
• Entitlement to assort: democracy, compromise culture and economic stability
• Economic interactions and social tolerance: a dynamic perspective
• How fear of future outcomes affects social dynamics

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