Combiners for backdoored random oracles

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-96881-0_10zbMATH Open1436.94039OpenAlexW2884588574MaRDI QIDQ1784094FDOQ1784094

Authors: Balthazar Bauer, Pooya Farshim, Sogol Mazaheri 

Publication date: 26 September 2018

Full work available at URL: https://hal.inria.fr/hal-01866724/file/770.pdf

Recommendations

• Towards defeating backdoored random oracles: indifferentiability with bounded adaptivity
• Generic attacks on hash combiners
• Some observations on the theory of cryptographic hash functions
• Compression from Collisions, or Why CRHF Combiners Have a Long Output
• The sum can be weaker than each part

zbMATH Keywords

lower boundscommunication complexityrandom oraclecombinerset-disjointnessset-intersection

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60)

Cited In (4)

• Towards defeating backdoored random oracles: indifferentiability with bounded adaptivity
• Security Analysis of Constructions Combining FIL Random Oracles
• Immunizing backdoored PRGs
• Subversion-resilient authenticated encryption without random oracles

This page was built for publication: Combiners for backdoored random oracles

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1784094)