Equivalence nucleolus for coalitional games with externalities
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Recommendations
- On the existence of a cooperative solution for a coalitional game with externalities
- Consistent solutions for cooperative games with externalities.
- Games with externalities: games in coalition configuration function form
- Consistency and the core in games with externalities
- Stable partitions for games with non-transferable utility and externalities
Cites work
- A game-theoretic perspective on coalition formation.
- A recursive core for partition function form games
- Consistent solutions for cooperative games with externalities.
- Equilibrium binding agreements
- Expectation formation rules and the core of partition function games
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3214144 (Why is no real title available?)
- N‐person games in partition function form
- The core in the presence of externalities
- The core of an economy with a common pool resource: a partition function form approach
- The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities
- The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
Cited in
(7)- On the existence of a cooperative solution for a coalitional game with externalities
- Consistency and the core in games with externalities
- The Nakamura theorem for coalition structures of quota games
- Coalition-proof Nash equilibria and cores in a strategic pure exchange game of bads
- A New Solution Concept for Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments
- Stable partitions for games with non-transferable utility and externalities
- Externalities and the (pre)nucleolus in cooperative games
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