The deterrence of collusion by a structural remedy

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2017.09.001MaRDI QIDQ1786748zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Joseph E. jun. Harrington

Publication date 25 September 2018

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.09.001

zbMATH Keywords

antitrustcollusioncompetition lawstructural remedy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

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