Deterministic mechanisms, the revelation principle, and ex-post constraints

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2017.09.039zbMATH Open1398.91105OpenAlexW2761447073MaRDI QIDQ1786784FDOQ1786784

Authors: Felix Jarman, Vincent Meisner 

Publication date: 25 September 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/58046/1/32.pdf

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zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designrevelation principleex-post constraints

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Cites Work

• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation
• Deterministic mechanisms and the revelation principle
• Ex-post optimal knapsack procurement

Cited In (4)

• Efficient sequential screening with informational externalities
• Deterministic mechanisms and the revelation principle
• A revelation principle for competing mechanisms
• Optimal contingent delegation

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