Deterministic mechanisms, the revelation principle, and ex-post constraints

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2017.09.039MaRDI QIDQ1786784zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Felix Jarman, Vincent Meisner

Publication date 25 September 2018

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/58046/1/32.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designrevelation principleex-post constraints

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

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Cites work

• Deterministic mechanisms and the revelation principle
• Ex-post optimal knapsack procurement
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation

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(4)

• Efficient sequential screening with informational externalities
• Deterministic mechanisms and the revelation principle
• A revelation principle for competing mechanisms
• Optimal contingent delegation

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