A tractable model of limited enforcement and the life-cycle dynamics of firms

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2017.11.025zbMATH Open1397.91384OpenAlexW2777800230MaRDI QIDQ1787294FDOQ1787294

Authors: Hengjie Ai, Rui Li 

Publication date: 5 October 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.11.025

Recommendations

• Optimal Lending Contracts and Firm Dynamics
• Enforcement frictions and optimal lending contracts
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zbMATH Keywords

capital structuredynamic contractfirm dynamicslimited enforcement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economic growth models (91B62)

Cites Work

• Optimal Lending Contracts and Firm Dynamics
• A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal–Agent Problem

Cited In (4)

• Enforcement frictions and optimal lending contracts
• Contracts, firm dynamics, and aggregate productivity
• Expectation driven business cycles with limited enforcement
• Entrepreneurship and firm heterogeneity with limited enforcement

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