A tractable model of limited enforcement and the life-cycle dynamics of firms

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2017.11.025MaRDI QIDQ1787294zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Hengjie Ai, Rui Li

Publication date 5 October 2018

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.11.025

zbMATH Keywords

capital structuredynamic contractfirm dynamicslimited enforcement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economic growth models (91B62)

Recommendations

• Optimal Lending Contracts and Firm Dynamics
• Enforcement frictions and optimal lending contracts
• Entrepreneurship and firm heterogeneity with limited enforcement
• Financial contracting under imperfect enforcement
• Optimal Contracts when Enforcement is a Decision Variable

Cites work

• A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal–Agent Problem
• Optimal Lending Contracts and Firm Dynamics

Cited in

(4)

• Contracts, firm dynamics, and aggregate productivity
• Enforcement frictions and optimal lending contracts
• Expectation driven business cycles with limited enforcement
• Entrepreneurship and firm heterogeneity with limited enforcement

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