Outcome equivalence in school choice with reciprocal preferences

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2018.05.033MaRDI QIDQ1787700zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Claus-Jochen Haake, Nadja Stroh-Maraun

Publication date 5 October 2018

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.05.033

zbMATH Keywords

Boston mechanismdeferred acceptance algorithmmanipulabilityschool choicetop trading cycles

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

• Constrained school choice
• The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach
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Cites work

• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

Cited in

(8)

• Acyclic priority profiles in school choice: characterizations
• School choice with neighbors
• Parallel markets in school choice
• A new perspective on Kesten's school choice with consent idea
• Accounting for heterogeneous returns in sequential schooling decisions
• School choice with transferable student characteristics
• The cost of strategy-proofness in school choice
• Weighted school choice problems and the weighted top trading cycles mechanism

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