Optimal penal codes in nearly symmetric Bertrand supergames with capacity constraints

DOI10.1016/0304-4068(94)00675-ZzbMath0829.90145OpenAlexW2032671063MaRDI QIDQ1804346

Val Eugene Lambson

Publication date: 14 May 1995

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(94)00675-z

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesoptimal penal codessymmetric Bertrand supergames with capacity constraints

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (7)

The suboptimality of optimal punishments in Cournot supergames ⋮ Optimal punishments with detection lags ⋮ Optimal collusion under cost asymmetry ⋮ A note on optimal penal codes in stochastic Bertrand supergames ⋮ Endogenous rationing, price dispersion and collusion in capacity constrained supergames ⋮ Marginal costs and collusive sustainability ⋮ Optimal punishments in linear duopoly supergames with product differentiation

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Extremal equlibria of oligopolistic supergames
• Some results on optimal penal codes in asymmetric Bertrand supergames
• Optimal Penal Codes in Price-setting Supergames with Capacity Constraints
• On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
• Price Duopoly and Capacity Constraints

This page was built for publication: Optimal penal codes in nearly symmetric Bertrand supergames with capacity constraints