How to make sense of the common prior assumption under incomplete information

DOI10.1007/S001820050117MaRDI QIDQ1806332zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Klaus Nehring, Giacomo Bonanno

Publication date 1 November 1999

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820050117

zbMATH Keywords

common beliefCommon priorHarsanyi consistencytruth axiom

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Economics of information (91B44)

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Cited in

(20)

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7450029 (Why is no real title available?)
• On the consistency among prior, posteriors, and information sets
• Countable spaces and common priors
• Characterizing common priors in the form of posteriors
• Agreeing to agree and Dutch books
• The positive foundation of the common prior assumption
• Almost common priors
• RATIONALIZATION IN SIGNALING GAMES: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS
• Similarity of differential information with subjective prior beliefs
• Agreeing to disagree with conditional probability systems
• The veil of public ignorance
• Common priors under incomplete information: a unification
• On the strategic impact of an event under non-common priors
• On the logic and role of negative introspection of common belief
• Common priors under endogenous uncertainty
• Finite order implications of common priors in infinite models
• Assessing the truth axiom under incomplete information
• Characterizing the common prior assumption.
• Iterated expectations, compact spaces, and common priors
• People with common priors can agree to disagree

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