Capital accumulation subject to pollution control: Open-loop versus feedback investment strategies

DOI10.1023/A:1018994716675MaRDI QIDQ1808210zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Martina Stimming

Publication date 2 December 1999

Published in Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1018994716675

zbMATH Keywords

differential gameduopolistic competitionemission taxesfeedback Nash equilibriainvestmentopen-loop Nash equilibriapollutiontradeable emission permits

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

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Cited in

(10)

• Capital-accumulation games under environmental regulation and duopolistic competition
• Dynamic optimal control of transboundary pollution abatement under learning-by-doing depreciation
• Optimal R\&D investment strategy of pollution abatement and incentive mechanism design under asymmetric information
• Dynamically consistent cooperative solution in a differential game of transboundary industrial pollution
• A dynamic analysis of corporate investments and emission tax policy in an oligopoly market with network externality
• AN ENVIRONMENTAL RESTRICTION AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN A CAPITALIST ECONOMY
• Dynamically consistent collaborative environmental management with production technique choices
• History-dependence in production-pollution-trade-off models: a multi-stage approach
• DYNAMICALLY CONSISTENT SOLUTION FOR A POLLUTION MANAGEMENT GAME IN COLLABORATIVE ABATEMENT WITH UNCERTAIN FUTURE PAYOFFS
• Environmental policy instruments in an international duopoly with feedback investment strategies.

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