The existence of equilibrium in incomplete markets and the objective function of the firm
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Publication:1815225
DOI10.1016/0304-4068(95)00720-2zbMath0858.90019WikidataQ57928093 ScholiaQ57928093MaRDI QIDQ1815225
Publication date: 7 November 1996
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(95)00720-2
91B50: General equilibrium theory
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