Reconsideration-proofness: A refinement for infinite horizon time inconsistency

DOI10.1006/game.1996.0058zbMath0860.90002OpenAlexW2037051009MaRDI QIDQ1816395

Narayana R. Kocherlakota

Publication date: 26 November 1996

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1996.0058

zbMATH Keywords

subgame perfect equilibriainconsistent preferencesinfinitely lived decision makerreconsideration-proof equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Decision theory for games (91A35)

Related Items (12)

On nonexistence of reconsideration-proof equilibrium with state variables ⋮ Ruling out multiplicity of smooth equilibria in dynamic games: a hyperbolic discounting example ⋮ Non-exclusive dynamic contracts, competition, and the limits of insurance ⋮ Renegotiation-proof contract in repeated agency ⋮ Naiveté and sophistication in dynamic inconsistency ⋮ Revision proofness ⋮ Time-inconsistent preferences and time-inconsistent policies ⋮ The Optimal Equilibrium for Time-Inconsistent Stopping Problems---The Discrete-Time Case ⋮ A theory of (relative) discounting ⋮ Repeated games with present-biased preferences ⋮ On uniqueness of time-consistent Markov policies for quasi-hyperbolic consumers under uncertainty ⋮ Multiple solutions under quasi-exponential discounting

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