Stable matching with preferences derived from a psychological model
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3148878 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3715248 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3400720 (Why is no real title available?)
- An efficient algorithm for the “stable roommates” problem
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Discrete Mathematics in Voting and Group Choice
- Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
- Ms. Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem
- Testing for the consecutive ones property, interval graphs, and graph planarity using PQ-tree algorithms
Cited in
(44)- Beauty and distance in the stable marriage problem
- The complexity of manipulative attacks in nearly single-peaked electorates
- Structured preferences: a literature survey
- Allocating group housing
- A characterization of the single-peaked domain
- Recovering single-crossing preferences from approval ballots
- Recognizing one-dimensional Euclidean preference profiles
- Campaign management under approval-driven voting rules
- The revealed preference theory of stable matchings with one-sided preferences
- Linear programming brings marital bliss
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1841882 (Why is no real title available?)
- Stable sharing
- Popularity on the roommate diversity problem
- The complexity of fully proportional representation for single-crossing electorates
- Pareto rationalizability by two single-peaked preferences
- Incentive compatibility for the stable matching model with an entrance criterion
- Short-run stable matchings between bees and flowers
- Single peaked domains with tree-shaped spectra
- Are there any nicely structured preference profiles nearby?
- Exact algorithms for weighted and unweighted Borda manipulation problems
- On treewidth and stable marriage: parameterized algorithms and hardness results (complete characterization)
- The one-dimensional Euclidean domain: finitely many obstructions are not enough
- Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues
- Stable Matching with Evolving Preferences
- Single-peaked consistency for weak orders is easy
- Structure of single-peaked preferences
- Strategic voting and strategic candidacy
- A characterization of the single-peaked single-crossing domain
- Parameterized complexity of stable roommates with ties and incomplete lists through the lens of graph parameters
- Recognizing single-peaked preferences on a tree
- Popularity on the roommate diversity problem
- On the existence of stable roommate matchings
- Consistency and its converse for roommate markets
- Geometric stable roommates
- A maximum \(b\)-matching problem arising from median location models with applications to the roommates problem
- Preferences single-peaked on a tree: multiwinner elections and structural results
- Subjective homophily and the fixtures problem
- Recognizing single-peaked preferences on an arbitrary graph: complexity and algorithms
- Revealed preference domains from random choice
- Testing a mixture model of single-peaked preferences
- Measuring nearly single-peakedness of an electorate: some new insights
- On the number of single-peaked narcissistic or single-crossing narcissistic preference profiles
- The shield that never was: societies with single-peaked preferences are more open to manipulation and control
- Combinatorial voter control in elections
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