Evolutionary stability in the repeated prisoner's dilemma

DOI10.1016/0040-5809(89)90027-0zbMath0679.92023MaRDI QIDQ1823196

Joseph Farrell, Roger Ware

Publication date: 1989

Published in: Theoretical Population Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0040-5809(89)90027-0

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary stability; conflict; cooperative strategies; Prisoner's dilemma; altruistic behavior; finite mixture of pure strategies; TIT-FOR-TAT

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

92D15: Problems related to evolution

91A40: Other game-theoretic models

92D50: Animal behavior

Related Items

EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION IN A SPATIAL PRISONER'S DILEMMA, Evolutionary game dynamics, Pareto efficiency, simple game stability, and social structure in finitely repeated games, Evolutionary dynamics of the spatial prisoner's dilemma with self-inhibition, An escape from ``the prisoner's dilemma, In and out of equilibrium. I: Evolution of strategies in repeated games with discounting., On the iterated prisoner's dilemma in a finite population, Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata, Evolutionarily stable strategies in the repeated prisoner's dilemma, Inefficient stage Nash is not stable, Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance, Lotka-Volterra equation and replicator dynamics: New issues in classification, Reciprocal cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma repeated with random horizon

Cites Work

• Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games
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