Evolutionarily stable strategies and viability selection in Mendelian populations
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Publication:1835874
DOI10.1016/0040-5809(82)90042-9zbMATH Open0504.92021OpenAlexW2018900982MaRDI QIDQ1835874FDOQ1835874
Authors: Ilan Eshel 
Publication date: 1982
Published in: Theoretical Population Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0040-5809(82)90042-9
Genetics and epigenetics (92D10) Applications of game theory (91A80) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)
Cites Work
- Assortment of encounters and evolution of cooperativeness
- Optimal rates of dispersal. I: Haploid populations
- Optimal rates of dispersal. II: Diploid populations
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- Models of animal conflict
- General two-locus selection models: Some objectives, results and interpretations
- Models of the evolution of altruism
Cited In (24)
- Gradients for the evolution of bimatrix games
- Genetical ESS-models. I. Concepts and basic model
- A maximum principle for frequency dependent selection
- The ``battle of the sexes: A genetic model with limit cycle behavior
- Coevolutionary instability of mixed Nash solutions
- The predator-dependent replicator dynamics
- Animal conflicts in diploid populations with sexual reproduction
- ESS germination strategies in randomly varying environments. I. Logistic- type models
- Coincidence of ESAD and ESS in dominant-recessive hereditary systems
- Genetic versus phenotypic models of selection: Can genetics be neglected in a long-term perspective?
- Evolutionarily stable strategies and short-term selection in Mendelian populations re-visited
- Evolutionary dynamics in frequency-dependent two-phenotype models
- Genetical ESS-models. II. Multi-strategy models and multiple alleles
- Frequency- and density-dependent selection: The two-phenotype model
- Fixation probabilities in evolutionary game dynamics with a two-strategy game in finite diploid populations
- Evolutionary stable strategies: A review of basic theory
- A theory for the evolutionary game
- On the changing concept of evolutionary population stability as a reflection of a changing point of view in the quantitative theory of evolution
- Spatial Mendelian games
- Sociobiology and the structural stability of behavior patterns
- Long-term evolution of polygenic traits under frequency-dependent intraspecific competition
- Evolutionary game dynamics
- Game theory and the evolution of cooperation
- Building a synthetic basis for kin selection and evolutionary game theory using population genetics
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