Evolutionarily stable strategies and viability selection in Mendelian populations

DOI10.1016/0040-5809(82)90042-9MaRDI QIDQ1835874zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ilan Eshel

Publication date 1982

Published in Theoretical Population Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0040-5809(82)90042-9

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionarily stable strategieslocally adaptive systemsMendelian populationsviability selection

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Applications of game theory (91A80) Genetics and epigenetics (92D10)

Cites work

• Assortment of encounters and evolution of cooperativeness
• General two-locus selection models: Some objectives, results and interpretations
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3170817 (Why is no real title available?)
• Models of animal conflict
• Models of the evolution of altruism
• Optimal rates of dispersal. I: Haploid populations
• Optimal rates of dispersal. II: Diploid populations

Cited in

(24)

• ESS germination strategies in randomly varying environments. I. Logistic- type models
• Evolutionary stable strategies: A review of basic theory
• Genetical ESS-models. I. Concepts and basic model
• Genetical ESS-models. II. Multi-strategy models and multiple alleles
• A maximum principle for frequency dependent selection
• A theory for the evolutionary game
• Gradients for the evolution of bimatrix games
• The ``battle of the sexes: A genetic model with limit cycle behavior
• Frequency- and density-dependent selection: The two-phenotype model
• Spatial Mendelian games
• Fixation probabilities in evolutionary game dynamics with a two-strategy game in finite diploid populations
• Animal conflicts in diploid populations with sexual reproduction
• Sociobiology and the structural stability of behavior patterns
• On the changing concept of evolutionary population stability as a reflection of a changing point of view in the quantitative theory of evolution
• Genetic versus phenotypic models of selection: Can genetics be neglected in a long-term perspective?
• Game theory and the evolution of cooperation
• Coincidence of ESAD and ESS in dominant-recessive hereditary systems
• Building a synthetic basis for kin selection and evolutionary game theory using population genetics
• Long-term evolution of polygenic traits under frequency-dependent intraspecific competition
• Evolutionarily stable strategies and short-term selection in Mendelian populations re-visited
• Evolutionary game dynamics
• The predator-dependent replicator dynamics
• Coevolutionary instability of mixed Nash solutions
• Evolutionary dynamics in frequency-dependent two-phenotype models

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