The value of two-person zero-sum repeated games. The extensive case

DOI10.1007/BF01753446zbMATH Open0283.90078OpenAlexW1964296405MaRDI QIDQ1844600FDOQ1844600

Authors: Jean-François Mertens 

Publication date: 1972

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01753446

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• The value of two-person zero-sum repeated games with lack of information on both sides
• A Lipschitzian Characterization of Convex Polyhedra

Cited In (10)

• Repeated games with incomplete information
• The value of two-person zero-sum repeated games with incomplete information and uncertain duration
• Repeated games with public uncertain duration process
• On repeated games with incomplete information played by non-Bayesian players
• Commutative Stochastic Games
• On a repeated game without a recursive structure
• Minmax and maxmin of repeated games with incomplete information
• Zero-sum repeated games: recent advances and new links with differential games
• On a repeated game with state dependent signalling matrices
• Solution for a class of repeated games without a recursive structure

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