Maximizing political efficiency via electoral cycles: An optimal control model

DOI10.1016/S0377-2217(01)00232-6zbMATH Open1006.91505MaRDI QIDQ1848601FDOQ1848601

Authors: Arieh Gavious, Shlomo Mizrahi 

Publication date: 13 November 2002

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

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zbMATH Keywords

controlinterest groupsgovernmentelectoral cyclespolitical efficiency

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics

Cited In (6)

• The personal wealth interests of politicians and government intervention in the economy
• Electoral control and the human capital of politicians
• Comparative analysis of Politician-bureaucratic governance structure and citizens' preference
• A dynamic analysis of special interest politics and electoral competition
• Modeling the influence of public's memory on the corruption-popularity dilemma in politics
• A discrete mathematical modeling and optimal control of the electoral behavior with regard to a political party

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