Maximizing political efficiency via electoral cycles: An optimal control model

DOI10.1016/S0377-2217(01)00232-6MaRDI QIDQ1848601zbMATHFDO

Authors Arieh Gavious, Shlomo Mizrahi

Publication date 13 November 2002

Published in European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

controlinterest groupsgovernmentelectoral cyclespolitical efficiency

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 45454 (Why is no real title available?)
• Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics

Cited in

(6)

• A discrete mathematical modeling and optimal control of the electoral behavior with regard to a political party
• Comparative analysis of Politician-bureaucratic governance structure and citizens' preference
• A dynamic analysis of special interest politics and electoral competition
• Electoral control and the human capital of politicians
• Modeling the influence of public's memory on the corruption-popularity dilemma in politics
• The personal wealth interests of politicians and government intervention in the economy

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