Inflation and Central Bank independence revisited

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(02)00132-5zbMATH Open1027.91037MaRDI QIDQ1852906FDOQ1852906

Authors: Harold J. Brumm 

Publication date: 21 January 2003

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

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zbMATH Keywords

InflationCentral Bank independence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Fiscal decentralization, central bank independence, and inflation

Cited In (10)

• Why should Central Banks avoid the use of the underlying inflation indicator?
• The sacrifice ratio and central bank independence revisited
• Does central bank financial strength really matter for inflation? The key role of the fiscal support
• Central bank independence, speed of disinflation and the sacrifice ratio
• The effect of central bank independence on inflation in developing countries
• Populism, political pressure and central bank (in)dependence
• Inflation-targeting rules: history-dependent or forward-looking?
• On Central Bank Independence and the Stability of Policy Targets
• Does central bank independence lower inflation?
• Fiscal decentralization, central bank independence, and inflation

Uses Software

• EQS

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